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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide insight into the current contributions of private schools to education provision in Tanzania, and to consider the feasibility of a school voucher program to contribute to the expansion of the secondary school system, compared to the alternative expansion of public secondary education. Design/methodology/approach The study offers an analysis of current educational circumstances and educational goals in Tanzania, and projects differential costs...
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In 2013, Tanzania introduced Big Results Now in Education, a low-stakes accountability program that published both nationwide and within-district school rankings. Using data from the universe of school performance from 2011-2016, we identify the impacts of the reform using a difference-in-differences estimator that exploits the differential pressure exerted on schools at the top and bottom of their respective district rankings. We find that BRN improved learning outcomes for schools in the...
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In 2013, Tanzania introduced "Big Results Now in Education", a low-stakes accountability program that published both nationwide and within-district school rankings. Using data from the universe of school performance from 2011-2016, we identify the impacts of the reform using a difference-in-differences estimator that exploits the differential pressure exerted on schools at the top and bottom of their respective district rankings. We find that BRN improved learning outcomes for schools in the...
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To achieve the twin objectives of incentivizing agent performance and providing information for planning purposes, public sector organizations often rely on reports by local monitors that are costly to verify. Received wisdom has it that attaching financial incentives to these reports will result in collusion, and undermine both objectives. Simple bargaining logic, however, suggests the reverse: pay for locally monitored performance could incentivize desired behavior and improve information....
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Public sector organizations often rely on reports by local monitors that are costly to verify and that serve twin objectives: to incentivize agent performance, and to provide information for planning purposes. Received wisdom has it that pay for locally monitored performance (P4LMP) will result in collusion and undermine both objectives. But simple Coasian logic suggests the reverse: P4LMP puts transferable money on the table and may enable interested parties to bargain to a more efficient...
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Local monitoring of schools has the potential to provide policymakers with information at low cost. If accurate, this information can then serve the dual purpose of incentivizing performance and reducing policy mistakes. Received wisdom suggests that the benet of raising performance via nancial incentives should be balanced against the risk of collusion resulting in false reporting. We evaluate two dierent forms of local monitoring by head teachers of Ugandan primary schools, randomly...
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Public sector organizations often rely on reports by local monitors that are costly to verify and that serve twin objectives: to incentivize agent performance, and to provide information for planning purposes. Received wisdom has it that pay for locally monitored performance (P4LMP) will result in collusion and undermine both objectives. But simple Coasian logic suggests the reverse: P4LMP puts transferable money on the table and may enable interested parties to bargain to a more efficient...